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List of Tables   viii   This volume arises from the international conference 'Russia and the Napoleonic Wars', which took place at the former country estate of the Lieven family at Mezotnes (Mesothen), Latvia, 15-18 May 2014. The purpose of the conference was to bring together scholars from Western Europe and North America with scholars from Russia and Eastern Europe to create a forum in which ideas could be exchanged and scholarship on the Napoleonic era taken forward. The combination of the end of the Soviet Union and a number of bicentenaries celebrating key moments in FrancoRussian relations has led to a flourishing of new scholarship in Russia; at the same time, new research in archives has led to new interpretations of this period by scholars in many countries. Language has, however, sometimes been a barrier to the exchange of ideas: Russian scholarship has not always reached a Western audience; new directions in foreign scholarship have not always been accessible to Russian scholars. This was overcome at this conference by translating all the papers in advance and by the use of interpreters. The conference was a great success. Twenty-four papers were given by scholars from eight countries and 17 of those papers have been selected here. All 24 papers were published in Russian by the Russian State Historical Museum in late 2014 as a special volume, entitled Rossiia i Napoleonovskie voiny and edited by Viktor Bezotosnyi, in the series Epokha 1812 goda: Issledovaniia, istochniki, istoriografiia. The conference organizers from the United Kingdom were Janet M. Hartley and Paul Keenan from the London School of Economics and Political Science and Dominic Lieven from Trinity College Cambridge (and LSE IDEAS). The conference organizer from Russia was Viktor Bezotosnyi from the Russian State Historical Museum, Moscow. The conference would not have been such a success without the organizational skills of Liza Ryan from LSE IDEAS. Above all, the editors wish to thank Dr Frederik Paulsen, whose generosity set up the Paulsen programme within IDEAS at the London School of Economics and Political Science and funded this conference in Latvia in full.
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General Maps xv This book's focus is on Russia and the Napoleonic Wars. The importance and timeliness of the topic can hardly be questioned. The Napoleonic Wars had a big impact on Russia's state, society and economy. Their immense cost ravaged state finances and played a part in Russia's sharply reduced rate of economic growth in the first half of the nineteenth century. Victory over the seemingly all-powerful foreign enemy provided added legitimacy to the tsarist regime and contributed to the cautious and conservative mind set of Nicholas I when faced with the need to confront serfdom and other obstacles to modernization. Above all war and victory changed the way many educated Russians thought about themselves and their country. When Tolstoi began to work on War and Peace he did so with the aim of explaining the impact of the war on Russian mentalities and showing how victory over Napoleon had fed into the Decembrist movement, whose aim it was to replace the absolute monarchy with a constitutional or even republican regime. The Decembrist rising in 1825 and the reaction to it of Nicholas I's regime played a great role in the 'parting of the ways' between state and society which was to dominate much of the subsequent political history of imperial Russia down to the revolution. Probably even more dramatic was Russia's impact on Europe during and immediately after the Napoleonic Wars. 1812 was the decisive turning point in Napoleon's bid to create lasting French hegemony in Europe. Had he succeeded in his aim of forcing Russia into subservience then his Empire would have been unchallengeable on the European continent. The European order created by French imperialism would no doubt have crumbled in time for internal reasons but the Europe it bequeathed would have been very different -for better or worse -to the one whose origins lay in the victory of the anti-French sixth coalition and the overthrow of Napoleon. In itself 1812 did not determine Napoleon's destruction. Alexander I, imbued with his own vision of Russia's part in a stable European order, seized the opportunity of Napoleon's temporary weakness in the winter of 1812-1813 to invade central Europe and form a new coalition of great powers committed to removing
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French rule from Germany. Without the tsar's vision and Russian leadership Germany would have remained under Napoleon's control. Having driven France out of Germany Alexander then played the leading role in taking the coalition forces all the way to Paris and overthrowing Napoleon. He did so out of the conviction -correct in my view -that Napoleon would always seek to subvert any stable European order acceptable to the other great powers. Having played the leading role in Napoleon's overthrow Russia went on to exercise a great influence on the subsequent post-war European order both as regards the territorial settlement agreed at the Congress of Vienna and the principles which underlay international relations until the 1850s.
Given the importance of Russia's contribution to the Napoleonic Wars it is remarkable how little these wars have been studied from a Russian angle. It is fair to state that as regards Western, and especially English-language, scholarship on the era Russia remains the biggest gap. For this there are many reasons. War and diplomacy have not been fashionable subjects for Western academic historians in recent decades and historians of Russia were no exception. They faced the additional obstacle that throughout the Soviet era, Russian military and diplomatic archives were closed to foreigners. Although considerable published sources existed, few historians of the wars who were not Russian specialists could read Russian. Nor did there seem a great incentive to learn the language. Anglophone historians were far more likely to learn French or German which unlocked the secrets of Napoleon's military machine or of the reformed Prussian army of these years, which together were taken as the harbingers of military modernity. Russia by contrast was seen as the embodiment of conservatism and the most powerful pillar of the European old regime. Historians are often inclined to concentrate their attention on the elements of change and modernity in history, so this made devoting time to Russian studies in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras additionally unappealing.
This was compounded by the situation of Russia's own historians in the Soviet era. Their works were very seldom translated into foreign languages and were subject to the 'party line' when it came to interpreting history. Ideological blinkers imposed, for example, far-fetched interpretations of the role of 'the masses' in Napoleon's defeat in 1812 and seriously distorted understanding of Alexander's role in Russian foreign policy and grand strategy. Even before 1917 Russian patriotic narratives were inclined to obsess about the minutiae of the 1812 campaign and to forget Russia's role in 1813-1814. Soviet-era historiography greatly strengthened this bias. With the collapse of the Soviet regime ideological stereotypes weakened and fresh approaches became possible. Western historians were permitted to work in Russian archives. A fruitful exchange of knowledge and perspectives between Russian and Western historians of the Napoleonic era became possible. The present book is the result of these new possibilities both in general and in the more specific sense that it is based on an international conference held in Latvia in May 2014 in which Russian experts on the Napoleonic era sat alongside their British, American, French, German, Canadian and Polish colleagues. Some of these scholars had long-established reputations in the field but others were young historians just beginning to make their mark. This too contributed to the interest of the discussions. Great thanks are due to Dr Frederik Paulsen who funded this conference so generously.
Three contributions to this book -by Dominic Lieven, Michael Broers and Alan Forrest -seek to put Russia in a broader context. Dominic Lieven takes the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era as a whole and asks to what extent it represented a fundamental break with the past as regards war and diplomacy. To some extent this boils down to assessing the impact of the French and Industrial revolutions, which are generally seen as the key dividing line between the early modern and modern eras of European history. Lieven concludes that although there were major changes in this era -not least in the sheer scale of warfare -on the whole elements of continuity outweighed elements of change. The impact of the Industrial Revolution on warfare began in the mid-nineteenth century. Though the influence of the French Revolution on war and international relations was certainly greater in the Napoleonic era, nevertheless Napoleon was in the end defeated by the European old regime, albeit in somewhat modified form. Part of Lieven's argument is that although in the long run the European old regime was overwhelmed by the power of the forces unleashed by revolution, it proved more formidable, flexible and intelligent than is often believed.
Michael Broers discusses Napoleon's Empire, which he sees as underpinned by the French elite's confidence in the superiority of their own high culture and by their vision of French leadership in the cause of European civilization. Broers makes parallels with Roman imperialism and especially with Cicero's belief that good laws were universally applicable. In this respect Napoleon's Empire was also very much an Enlightenment project. Although Napoleon's Empire embodied French national pride, interests and values it was able to root itself most securely in what Broers calls an inner imperial zone around the axis of the rivers Rhine, Saone and Rhone. In this more developed core region the Empire's institutions functioned more effectively and its ideology had greater resonance than in the outer zone. It is important to note that this outer zone included large areas of western and southern France itself. Napoleon's was an empire of the towns, not the countryside. It was an elitist project which dragged outlying rural areas into the ambit of the state's fiscal, conscription and police agencies. Its most lasting legacy was the greatly enhanced reach and power of the state. But this urban world was in many respects a traditional one. If Catholic peasantries in revolt against the Enlightenment hated the Empire so too did great cities whose values were commercial and whose prosperity was linked to the Atlantic trade routes. So it is too simple just to equate the Napoleonic Empire with a move towards modernity.
Whereas Michael Broers offers a splendid overall conception of Napoleon's Empire, Alan Forrest's focus is more limited. Nevertheless his analysis of why Napoleon chose to invade Russia in 1812 provides an essential context for any book devoted to looking at Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars. Forrest sets out the reasons which inspired Napoleon to go to war with Russia as well as his war aims. He points out that the latter were strictly limited. Napoleon hoped to fight a 'cabinet war' of short duration that would force Alexander I to accept Russia's subordination to French grand strategy. The latter was above all defined by the aims and requirements of France's competition with Britain. Alan Forrest also illustrates Napoleon's under-estimation of Russian power and resolve, and seeks to explain this under-estimate. Finally, Forrest's contribution assesses the strength that Napoleon could bring to bear against Russia as well as some of the weaknesses in Napoleon's military and political machine.
The core of the book is devoted to Russia. Elise Wirtschafter looks at Russian conceptions of what a proper European order should be and how it should be created. To an extent her chapter balances that of Michael Broers. Though broad in conception, Wirtschafter's contribution focuses on Russian thinking after 1815 and concentrates in particular on a document in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive entitled 'Review of the Year 1819'. This review was drafted by top advisers to Alexander I but endorsed by the monarch himself. As Wirtschafter argues, the Russian leadership's views on European order were like Napoleon's in the sense that they were deeply rooted in Enlightenment thought. The review stressed the need for moderation, rationality and reason. It argued that Russian policy had for years embodied all three of these virtues. Underlying this emphasis was a deep desire for tranquillity and opposition to anything that threatened Europe's still fragile peace. Past and present must be reconciled: there could be no unthinking return to the pre-1789 order. On the other hand, the review stressed that stable government had to be rooted in a people's customs and values. The Christian religion was the only solid social and cultural basis for a stable political order. But it contributed not just the stability desired by realist politicians but also the hope for an ethical international system founded on co-operation among the great powers.
The key figure in grand strategy and diplomacy on the Russian side was Alexander I. Marie-Pierre Rey, author of an outstanding biography of Alexander, focuses in her contribution on Alexander's relationship with Talleyrand. Her chapter complements those by Michael Broers and Elise Wirtschafter. Marie-Pierre Rey shows that Alexander and Talleyrand, both children of the Enlightenment, shared a common conception of European order and France's necessary place within it. They both rejected Napoleon's lack of balance or limits. Rey's contribution looks in detail at how Alexander and Talleyrand worked together towards Napoleon's overthrow. She shows that both men sought stability but were also guided by a commitment to certain liberal principles. Alexander and Talleyrand shared the fear that a restored Bourbon regime would be unwilling or unable to incorporate parts of the revolutionary heritage and would therefore endanger the cause of both liberty and stability. Both statesmen finally accepted Louis XVIII but worked together to ensure that the restored Bourbon regime would guarantee civil and political rights and would accommodate Napoleonic-era French elites.
Aleksandr Orlov studies Russo-British relations from Tilsit until the invasion of 1812. Inevitably such a study cannot avoid also looking at French perceptions of the Anglo-Russian relationship. The main focus of this contribution is on Russo-British commercial relations and the impact on Russian financial and economic well-being of subordination to Napoleon's Continental System. Orlov shows that Alexander was forced to tread an always narrow and ever-shrinking path between infuriating Napoleon and bankrupting the Russian treasury and economy. Both Petersburg and London did everything possible to avoid their 'cold war' turning hot. Both sides understood that they needed each other and might well renew their alliance at some point. The implication of Orlov's argument is that although other factors (including above all Poland) made a big contribution to the breakdown of the Franco-Russian alliance, the needs of Russia's economy were in themselves sufficient to force Russo-British reconciliation and Russia's retreat from the entente with Napoleon.
Once Britain's position becomes an object of study attention shifts from a narrowly European to a global perspective. This is important since the Napoleonic Wars were actually a global struggle. If most of the military action was concentrated in Europe that was because British sea power locked French imperialism into the European continent. The Royal Navy stymied Napoleon's hopes of restoring French Empire in North America or using Egypt as a stepping stone towards a renewed challenge to Britain's position in India. India was indeed the core of the new global empire which Britain succeeded in creating at precisely the same moment that France was making an heroic but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to create an empire in Europe. In this context it is worth noting that the revenues of British India even in 1815 were greater than those of the Russian or Austrian Empires. David Schimmelpenninck provides an insight into Russian thinking about India. Catherine II dreamed of asserting Russian influence in the sub-continent and her son, Paul I, actually sent off a Cossack army to attack India along the traditional invasion route of cavalry armies across the northwest frontier. The attempt proved a fiasco and contributed to the widespread view within the Russian elites that Paul was deranged. Subsequently, Alexander I would have nothing of Napoleon's efforts to lure him into a joint challenge to Britain's position in India, which the tsar considered altogether a fantasy.
Of course the Russian army lay at the core of Russian power and along with skilful and realistic diplomacy played the key role in Napoleon's downfall. Viktor Bezotosnyi is probably the leading living Russian expert on the Russian army in the Napoleonic era. Not merely has he written a number of outstanding studies of Russian military forces and operations, he also played a key role in setting up in 2012 the fine new museum dedicated to Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars on Red Square in Moscow. His piece in this book investigates the struggles between individuals and factions within the Russian military elite in 1812-1814. These struggles bewildered foreign observers such as Carl von Clausewitz at the time and have continued to baffle foreign historians ever since. Bezotosnyi's chapter includes many insights into the structure of Russian politics and the values of the imperial military and aristocratic elite in this era. The military elite is shown to have had specific characteristics but also to have reflected many features of the social and political elite as a whole. Bezotosnyi shows how Alexander managed the Russian elite. Certain elements were constant factors throughout the period. A vital one was the near obsession with rank and seniority among the generals. Almost as constant was the struggle between so-called Russian and German factions. But the author shows that neither of these factions was either constant in membership or internally united. Allegiances changed according to specific contexts and challenges. In-fighting within the military leadership often reflected disagreements over specific operational choices (e.g. whether to fight at the gates of Moscow in 1812) though this in turn was often intertwined with the ambitions of specific senior generals and their clienteles. Each commander-inchief (Barclay de Tolly, Kutuzov and Wittgenstein) carried with him his own following. Since to a great extent all major conflicts revolved around attempts to win the monarch's support, it mattered crucially whether (as in 1813-1814) Alexander was with the army in person. Another fundamental difference was between 1812 when Russia fought alone and the coalition war of 1813-1814 when Russian generals might even unite against the common Prussian or Austrian 'foe'.
The other piece which directly studies the Russian army is Denis Svidzhkov's work on Prince Eugen of Württemberg. Eugen's prominence in the campaigns of 1812-1814 would in itself warrant such a study. Eugen was an inspirational leader on the battlefields of Borodino and Leipzig. On two key occasions in these years he also showed exceptional intelligence, insight and coolness. Without these qualities the Russian army might have suffered disaster as it retreated after abandoning Smolensk. Most important was Eugen's vital role in extricating the allies from potential disaster after the lost battle of Dresden in 1813 and opening the way for the decisive victory at Kulm which followed immediately afterwards. This was one of the truly crucial turning points in the collapse of Napoleon's Empire. But Eugen's biography also has much to say about the values that permeated the Russian -and other -military leadership towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The fact that so important a figure has largely been neglected by historians provides insights into core failings of Russian and Western historiography on 1812-1814. In the Russian case Eugen was largely forgotten because he was a German and not even a subject of the tsar. The leading Russian chronicler of the wars, General Aleksandr I. MikhailovskiiDanilevskii, for example, played down Eugen's role in order to reserve the laurels of victory for Russians. But it is also symptomatic of Western historians' neglect of Russia's role in the wars that Eugen's memoirs -probably the fullest and most insightful record left by a Russian general of the era -have barely been consulted despite the fact that they are written in German.
Russia's defeat of Napoleon was owed to much more than courageous soldiers and wily diplomats. The Empire's resources were mobilized effectively. These resources were both physical and moral. Liudmila Marnei writes on a crucial but neglected aspect of Russia's war effort, namely her finances. She describes both Russia's potential financial weakness and how the government sought to address it. Russia's fiscal and financial strategy included use of customs revenue, taxes (both regular and emergency), recourse to what amounted to forced loans repayable after the war, borrowing both within Russia and abroad, and schemes for so-called 'federal money' usable by Russian (and later allied) forces operating beyond the Empire's borders but largely guaranteed by Britain. There was a clear distinction between how the war was financed in 1812 and 1813-1814. Fighting on home soil the army largely depended on requisitioning supplies from the population in return for receipts which were later counted off against tax obligations. Also vital were huge and often voluntary contributions of food, money and horses by Russian society. Once the Russian armies moved abroad in 1813-1814 their financing became much more complicated. At this point advantageous agreements with (above all) Prussia, British subsidies, and heavy requisitioning in Poland all contributed mightily to victory.
Some aspects of Russian wartime finance are touched on by other contributors. In her piece on the Russian home front in the provinces Janet Hartley provides a clear guide to voluntary contributions to the war effort in 1812. It is impossible to define the full extent of these contributions in money terms because many donations went unrecorded or were made in kind. Beyond question, however, they were enormous and were vital to the Russian war effort. As with the majority of contributions, Janet Hartley's piece is based on extensive use of Russian (and other) archival sources, as well as on recent Russian scholarship on 1812. As Hartley illustrates, it is often hard to determine whether contributions were indeed voluntary or were in reality demanded and levied by the state despite rhetoric to the contrary. If this is true of donations it is even more the case as regards volunteering for the emergency militias set up in many provinces in 1812. Hartley shows that in the overwhelming majority of cases the rank and file of the militia were conscripts, though even here there were exceptions. Officers were with few exceptions volunteers though often subject to social and governmental pressure. The motives for entering the militia also sometimes had more to do with personal ambition and financial need than patriotism. Nevertheless, Hartley concludes, in rejecting overly saccharine accounts of patriotic sacrifice one must not move too far towards cynicism. Widespread support for the war effort in Russian society was crucial to the government's ability to mobilize resources on a scale to match Napoleon's much richer and more populous Empire and its satellites.
The chapters by Paul Keenan and Liubov Melnikova go some way towards explaining the sources of Russian support for the war effort and how the government sought to use them. Keenan's piece looks at how the court reacted to Russia's largely unsuccessful war effort in 1805-1807 which included a number of military defeats and culminated in the widely unpopular treaty of Tilsit. He studies official announcements from the emperor's palace, as well as the rituals and celebrations that marked the outer life of the court. These were in part designed to put the best possible twist on events, thereby for instance propagating an official line (the only one which could be expressed in public) on the benefits of peace in 1807. In general court spectacles and rituals were designed to place the monarch and dynasty at the centre of elite society, to cast them in a splendid but also benevolent light, but also through religious ceremonies, military parades and commemoration of dynastic birthdays and anniversaries to link the Romanovs in particular to the two greatest sources of the dynasty's legitimacy, namely its status as protector of Russian Orthodoxy and its role in making Russia a formidable and respected military power.
Whereas Paul Keenan's study of the court studies an institution most visible to Russian elites, Liubov Melnikova's study of the Orthodox Church's support for the war effort has wider implications which stretch throughout society. At all times a key ally of the monarchy, in the crisis of 1812 the Church was vital in mobilizing Russian feeling against the invader. This applied not just to society as a whole but also specifically to the army. In this context it is worth remembering that unlike even the British (let alone French) army of the time, Russian regiments were fully served by priests and deacons, the little world of the regiment being a microcosm of the Orthodox fatherland, whose guardian was the tsar. The Church encouraged the widespread view among Russians that they were engaged in a war between rival civilizations: an ordered, hierarchical and God-fearing Russia faced the onslaught of a de-Christianized, immoral and unruly France. Napoleon was depicted as the Antichrist and the Church appealed to the population to rise up against him in defence of their Orthodox home. French marauding, and particularly the desecration of churches, lent this call additional plausibility.
Andrzej Nieuwazny looks at the Duchy of Warsaw under Russian occupation in 1813-1814. His analysis exposes the differences between Alexander I and his generals on the ground. The emperor was intent on annexing the territory at the end of the war and was intent on appealing for the Polish nobility's support. The military leadership was concerned with more mundane and immediate issues such as the creation of an effective administration willing and able to mobilize Polish resources to feed and supply the Russian army. Nieuwazny discusses in detail the varied Polish response to Russian occupation. The basic attitude of the Polish masses was exhaustion from the constant demands of armies crossing the country in 1811-1814 and a longing for peace. Part of the Polish elite cooperated with the occupiers with varying degrees of willingness and efficiency. Others remained aloof. Actual resistance in Nieuwazny's analysis was rare and has been much exaggerated by Polish and Soviet historians. Nevertheless wide sectors of Polish educated society longed for Napoleon to conquer the allies and restore Polish independence. With the fate of the campaign hanging in the balance until the battle of Leipzig in October 1813 Polish disaffection was a constant source of concern to the Russian occupiers. Only after Leipzig did Polish elites as a whole accept that Alexander would be the key arbiter of their country's fate. Hopes pinned on his benevolence and liberalism were in fact to a surprising degree well-founded in these years.
Although the core of this book is devoted to Russia during the Napoleonic Wars, three chapters instead cover the long-term impact of the conflict on Russian government, society and memory. Grigorii Bibikov looks specifically at the role of 'heroes' of 1812-1814 from among the Russian military leadership and their subsequent role in Russian government. An important point to note is that many of these 'heroes' were promoted on merit to senior ranks at a very young age in 1813-1814. Thereafter they remained key figures in government and army for many decades. As one would expect, the army itself was dominated well into the mid-nineteenth century by generals who had distinguished themselves in the epic struggle against Napoleon. Especially as they aged, this did not always work to the army's benefit as it struggled to meet new challenges. The military heroes of 1812-1814 drew most ire in Russian society when they occupied key civilian positions for which they were by no means usually well-equipped by temperament or training. The prominence of soldiers in top civil posts also owed much to Nicholas I's unique trust in military men and methods but also to the lack of a welltrained and professional civil bureaucracy. As a civilian bureaucratic elite did begin to emerge from the educational institutions established by Alexander I and Nicholas I it grew increasingly frustrated by its subordination to aging generals-cum-ministers. But the military stranglehold on top positions was only finally broken by the death of Nicholas I and the de-legitimation of his system during the disastrous Crimean War of 1854-1856.
Alexander Martin looks at the impact of 1812 on the process of civilization and refinement in Russia. His piece draws on the concept of civilization created by Norbert Elias. Martin's evidence is overwhelmingly drawn from Moscow, on whose history in pre-revolutionary times he is an internationally recognized expert. Martin argues that 1812 reflected the civilizing process in Moscow in three ways. It accelerated this process by shocking Muscovites into new and deeper ways of analysing their world and the external forces to which it was subject. By temporarily disrupting normal patterns of urban life it revealed just how much progress had previously been made in turning Moscow into a civilized centre of sociability and the exchange of ideas. More concretely and in the longer term, by ruining many aristocratic grandees 1812 undermined the domination of Muscovite society by the aristocracy and opened the way to the development of a broader and freer civil society in the city. But Alexander Martin is at pains not simply to fit the events of 1812 into some liberal narrative of progress. As he argues elsewhere, the anarchy and widespread impoverishment inflicted on Muscovites in 1812 strengthened an already deeply held conservative longing for order and a distrust of popular 'spontaneity'.
The final chapter is by Tatiana Saburova and is a study of commemorative practices and historical memory of 1812 in Russia. It will be of great interest to the many Western historians specializing in the fields of memory and commemoration. Saburova's piece links up with Paul Keenan's chapter on how the court commemorated the events of 1805-1807 and confirms a key point made by Alexander Martin, namely that the war (and especially 1812) gave birth to a new literary genre, the war memoir. Saburova covers an impressively wide canvas in thought-provoking style. Among the topics covered are: the evolution of the military memoir; changing interpretations of the Napoleonic Wars in the literature of the 1850s and 1860s in light of the Crimean War and the Polish uprising of 1863; commemorative monuments and architecture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special attention going to the battlefield of Borodino; the centenary celebrations of 1812, commemoration of the 'people's war' in the Soviet era, and the 150th and 200th anniversary celebrations in 1962 and 2012.
Although the questions tackled in this book should contribute greatly to an English-speaking readership's understanding of Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars there inevitably remains much work to be done to fill the large gap that currently exists. In some cases this work will be done by contributors to this book whose chapters reflect preliminary findings derived from research that is still underway. One example of this is Elise Wirtschafter's chapter which forms a small part of a research project whose aim is to analyse the theoretical underpinnings of foreign policy in Alexander I's reign by looking at evolving Russian conceptions of international order from 1801 to 1825. Not just the monarch but also a number of highly intelligent advisers contributed to this thinking. Good biographies already exist in English of Prince Adam Czartoryski and Count Ioannis Kapodistrias: the time is overdue for equivalent biographies of Karl von Nesselrode and Count Nikolai P. Rumiantsev. The latter in particular was a fascinating individual who thought deeply and in original ways about Russia's place in the evolving global economic and political order but was also a major cultural figure.
After reading this collected work it is in fact easy to produce a long list of possible future avenues for research. Comparisons between Napoleon's and Alexander's imperial systems of rule might be an obvious place to start: in this case one could look at the two Empires in terms of effective penetration of society and mobilization of resources. Alternatively, one could compare them as Enlightenment projects. For a military historian, the campaigns of 1813-1814 remain an almost open field for investigation of how Russian military professionalism developed during the Napoleonic era. Deeper study of Russia's war economy would contribute greatly not just to our understanding of how and why Russia won the war of 1812-1814 but also of areas of technological progress and backwardness in Russian industry. An historian of memory and commemoration might usefully pursue the theme of why Russians succeeded in forgetting so much of what happened in the Napoleonic Wars, and not least why the greatest triumphs of imperial Russian arms and diplomacy in 1813-1814 have slipped almost entirely out of the collective memory. No doubt other historians could set out alternative and equally alluring agendas for future research. On one point, however, I think all would agree. Whatever happens to the political climate, fruitful collaboration between Russian and foreign historians must be preserved.
